Azthor

I must concede insofar as that any given organized activity towards the removal of viscosity, however artificially so, still partially fulfills the purpose of viscosity. Yet still, viscosity has a goal others than its own removal, or the only reasonable argument that could be made would be the removal of its entirety. While the reduction of the perceivable game world is a powerful threat, it is one that is more likely to be answered by an immediate approach, travel for the sake of reducing viscosity, rather than a purpose-oriented one, the enrichment of those locations that lack activity. At best. Here, viscosity is being seem as a disease where it is but a symptom; either the actual problem is deemed unmanageable and viscosity must be removed, or it is deemed manageable and those initiatives necessary are put forth. Viscosity is only fulfilling its role when it is being a bother, and can only be considered to have fulfilled that role when it no longer holds any sway. If the suppression of viscosity depends on activities that would cease with its end, then it is not a solution. Your point of view as expressed in "If ppl is not interested in some locations ... then ... we don't need those location" is an entirely valid one, alas, I'd rather believe that every given scene has a purpose, may or not have those individuals who are attached to them, and may or not hold allure to a new player. To hide a scene is to castrate the game, and though those individuals that are fond of a given area might try and push activity its way, some scenes may altogether fade from the perception of younger players.

Viscosity may be a measure of activity in a given location, alas, it is hardly a neutral tool. Those locations more often visited become more prone to being visited, whereas those locations least visited become less prone to be visited. In sum, it is a measure of activity, but it is also a radicalizing factor; more importantly, it is a radicalizing factor created with a purpose in mind. Visiting locations for no reason other than the removal of viscosity, it should go without saying, is to wholly miss the point. Viscosity has a purpose, and that is not movement for the sake of movement; if the community truly finds viscosity to be thus disruptive to the point they openly try and lower it merely for the sake of lowering it, and do so successfully, then viscosity is no longer fulfilling its role, and may as well be removed. Whereas initiative already exists, specially in the compulsory newbie path (the de facto removal of viscosity in No Man's Land)¹, one such a initiative has, ultimately, taken on a limited scope. If the difficulties of viscosity are to be tackled in accordance to their purpose, then autonomous reasons for players to visit a greater range of locations, possibly motivated by viscosity, but ultimately serving another purpose, must be created; that is to say, widespread zones of interest must be created or reinforced, rather than artificially generated travel. Here, player activity and the size of the player base are determinant, of course, and therefore one such a notion might sound much too romantic. Yet still, the creation or revival of said zones of interest and the enlargement of the player base should, presumably, go hand in hand. More specifically, to hide locations based on viscosity, rather than simply have them be suitably hard to access, is to ignore both the purpose inherent to each location and that of viscosity. Viscosity was not created to be a problem in and of itself, or so I am led to believe, but rather, merely a symptom and motivator. To say otherwise is to claim viscosity is a counterproductive mechanism, arbitrarily introduced and devoid of purpose. Some, or many, may share that view, but those who do would do better to altogether argue against viscosity, rather than support a patchwork job. ¹here, whereas one might still argue that the purpose of viscosity was deconstructed, it could also be said that another superseding criteria, the navigability of the immediate early game and its influence in the captivation and inflow of players, held more sway, as is only sensible.

Certainly. Whereas, here, I used the contrast merely as a key to open the argument with, it is ultimately widely accepted that most of the world uses one of two systems in the typification of their legal systems, common law and civil law, with a few mixed exceptions, as well as those nations which use sharia, religious law as written by the prophet. The earlier relates back, though neither should be seen as a direct continuity, to the Code of Justinian¹, and refers to systems built on statutory law, which is to say, law as written, a tradition further reinforced by Kelsen's General Theory of Law and State in 20th century Germany, but which can be found earlier, for instance, in the Napoleonic Code. Kelsen's primary contribution in that regard was the institution of positivist doctrine, laws as written and absolute, but one would do well not to close oneself to different perspectives here. The later, most well known for its prevalence in the US and the United Kingdom, is built on case law, law by precedent, Unlike civil law, common law was for a long time a system strictly detained to the British Island, however, with the British Empire, most of its subsidiaries would, even after their independence, continue to adopt the system, as is the case with India and the US. In effect, the key topic to be understood in that regard is that a civil law system seeks to maintain its integrity by the universal application of a same given set of codified laws, whereas previous cases, though they might be used as an argument in the absence of the letter of the law, have no imperative value. On the other hand, common law systems seek to main their integrity not in relying in a single typified code, but rather, by relying on precedent so as to ensure that a given sentence, in a given situation, does not vary from another, therefore maintaining its internal consistency. That said, let us move on to the matter of bias in a given legal system, and to what extent the point of any given system is a subjective form of justice or another subject altogether. This, being an ardent discussion in the field, rather than a widely accepted classification, I will only loosely approach. There are two areas widely open to personal influence in any given system, the creation of the laws themselves, which is to say, the legislative body or entity, and the application of these laws, the trial proper, embodied in those magistrates presiding over the sentence, as well as the jury, should the system sponsor trial by such. In the earlier, we must admit that, even though justice by those common standards of the nation may well be within the legislative body's interests, to say that is their sole interest would be foolhardy at best as an expectation to be assumed upon a fellow human being, And I speak of those common standards of the nation because, ultimately, many aspects of morality are intrinsically cultural, even as the widespreadness of a given set of western values might have led us to believe we've found common human values were there are, in fact, none. That is not say all of them are, or that I can state objectively which are and which are not. Far from it, if anything, I'd just likewise fall within a cultural standard. That is not to say, however, that tolerance is always the answer; while many of us are taught that from birth as a quintessential value, ultimately, the tolerant who passively stands before the intolerant is just waiting idly for their own destruction or subversion. Here, there is no truth to be found. That considered, the interests that permeate a given legislative body or entity are manifold; moral values, political interests, personal interests and even mood affect the legislator's decision the same as they would any other individual's, and though certain similarities might remain, not even the moral values are the same for every legislator. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to conceive any given legal framework as a work of platonic justice, even judged by the nation's average standards; here, though this is not the start and end of the matter, a convenient simplification would be to say that one such a framework is, first and foremost, a convenient imposition. Once we move on to the application of that framework, we are forced to add yet another layer of personality, as that system created by a given legislative body or derived from previous trials is once more subjected to interpretation². The presiding magistrate, those parties directly involved, their advocates and, if present, the jury, each have their own established moral framework, when not even personal interests in the trial's outcome, acting as yet another personal filter through which so called justice might be delivered. Unless law is deemed absolute and perfect as written², and one might then decide to altogether forego trial, these joint particularities will then serve as the final lens through which those original intentions, whichever they be, emanating from the legislative, will be distorted and cast into effect, that is, the sentence itself. More often than not, it is where the outcome agrees with our view that we call it just, and where it disagrees that we call it unjust. So long as the legal framework does not operate in a fashion thus conflicting so as to alienate large enough a part of the population to jeopardize the present system's legitimacy before the public, so does the framework continue to be considered sufficiently just by the majority and, in tandem, remain legitimate justice. Though there are a few things to be said as to absolute and/or universal values, we would then go from an analysis on the overall framework of legality to a territory deeply ingrained in my own set of beliefs, and so it is for best that we cut this short. I hope it is of some use. In hindsight, this may well have deviated much too far away from the thread's general intent; please feel free to delete this post if you believe it necessary. ¹consuetudinary law, a tradition most widespread through the Middle Ages, emphasizing local customs, rather than precedent or an unified system as written. Of Germanic tradition, though one should also note it did have a measure of influence in ancient Roman law, customary systems were slowly abandoned as national States formed, for, as they sought to take power from local elites and empower the bureaucracy, and as the scale of administration rose, so were increasingly standardized systems sought and implemented. Nowadays, for reasons all too similar, customary law, where it still exists, detains a subordinate role in the legal hierarchy. ²even civil law systems have this characteristic, codified as they may have become, for written law so clearly stated and weighed thus devoid of external influences that there is no room for argument has not yet been conceived. This is, ultimately, a flaw in Kelsen's predominantly scientific view of Law, in which positive law might consistently adapted in progressive fashion in accordance to the State's desires, rather than being constantly mutated by manifold interests.

And here is a delayed happy birthday!

Laws, whether codified under kelsenian positivism or supported by a vast jurisprudence in a system of common law, which is to say, law by precedent, ultimately rely on an alleged impartiality from magistrates and juries which, human beings integrating their respective societies, are all to partial, the same as the code itself is, whether by its heritage to the sovereign unit's culture or whether to the extension it serves the interests of those atop the social construct of hierarchy. Such impartiality does not, however, exist, and should not even be expected to exist in this scenario. What I see here is one side arguing for benefits it feels entitled to and another arguing against the existence of one such an entitlement. Therefore, the real subject of this discussion is the matter of entitlement. Credits serve but a single purpose as far as the whole is concerned, the maintenance of the basic financial supports necessary for the game's continued existence. That they are imperative towards the whole's continuity does not, however, mean that one such a position bears entitlement. While one might expect those buyers to see it as a donation with benefits, it is true that, being ultimately proposed as a shop, you are truly entitled to those items you purchase. This, however, is not an entitlement you've paid for in an agreed upon contract, unspoken or otherwise, but rather, a gift. That which you were entitled to has already been received, and that is the original credits; this is a gift, and as such, one cannot speak of fair or unfair, for it is already a privilege, and a privilege that, devoid of entitlement, should go under whichever criteria the giver would rather opt for. No less and no more. That said, the criteria chosen was that your credits spent be considered on a per account basis, and while nothing prevents you from asking that lesser amounts be considered for those rewards, that is a personal request, not an universal and taken for granted right. This is not an issue of greed, because greed we all indulge in, in our own respective ways, even if we are indoctrinated from birth to think that false, but rather, merely entitlement has been assumed where there is none In a sense, have you lost on potential gains in view of having put credits in other accounts? Certainly. Is it likely that you put those credits in other accounts with good intentions, as you claim? I don't see why not. That certainly might be enough reason for Mur to decide to gift you on the entirety of your spent credits, whether on those respective accounts or on a primary one, but fair or unfair play no part in that decision.

Amidst bleak darkness, untold landscapes whereupon, If a even a lone shadow is to therein reside, So must unforgiving light cast itself upon And over the stark contrast unfeelingly preside. Sanctimonious light, pure and untouchable; Destroyer, clinging to a glimpse, longing desperate. Encircling darkness, bleak and impenetrable; Ever reaching for untold corners desolate. A tale of two tyrants unlike any other, Distant entities, uncaring and almighty; And yet this tale they must weave against each other, Forever toiling to work the grand tapestry. Forces stranger and unutterable have tried, All in vain, comprehension they always lacked.